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This is the ninth volume in the Arne Ryde Memorial Lecture Series. This time-
honored initiative brings onto paper thought-provoking lectures at the edge of the
current research.
The goal of this book is to demonstrate how the study of revenue management
may be enriched when taking the perspective of mechanism design. Traditionally,
the former deals with nonstrategic agents arriving over time, and assumes complete
information about their characteristics. Its aim is to derive dynamic pricing policies,
including decisions about inventory size and composition, for maximizing revenue or,
sometimes, efficiency. Mechanism design, on the other hand, presumes that agents are
privately informed and considers the limitations that this imposes on implementable
policies. By bringing the techniques of mechanism design to bear on a few topical
problems of revenue management, Gershkov and Moldovanu open a path towards
making it more realistic, and suggest that mechanism design is ripe to attack a new
field.
The book is organized in six chapters. The first is a clear and exhaustive summary
of its content, carefully describing both the models studied in each chapter and the
results obtained. Table 1.1 on p. 8 gives a bird’s eye view. The next four chapters deal
with distinct (but related) variants of the following problem: a set of heterogeneous
itemsmust be assigned to a sequence of randomly arriving agentswith privately known
characteristics. The agents are short-lived, meaning that they cannot fake a later arrival
and manipulate the timing of their purchase. The sixth and last chapter assumes long-
lived agents and provides a miscellaneous collection of simple examples and short
results.
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As part of a Lecture Series, the volume is meant to be neither a textbook nor
a full monograph. The four central chapters rely on research published elsewhere.
However, by revisiting their own research and juxtaposing it in one place,Gershkov and
Moldovanu offer us a convincing case that the combination of revenue management
and mechanism design provides a powerful approach to tackle a variety of problems.
The last chapter, more varied in content as well as less systematic, is a tantalizing
invitation to push the frontier even further. Each chapter is enriched with a review of
the literature and, in the spirit of the best lecturing, almost all theoretical results are
illustrated by sharp and effective examples. Here follows a short description for the
content of each main chapter.
Chapter 2 (Sequential assignment of heterogeneous objects) studies efficient, indi-
vidually rational and budget-balancedmechanismswhen agents have one-unit demand
and private information. The main trade-off is whether assigning an object today or
in the future. The efficient dynamic allocation under complete information is well
known. After introducing private information and assuming quasi-linear utilities, it is
shown that there exists an efficient variant of a Vickrey–Clarke–Groves mechanism
based on dynamic menus of prices.
Chapter 3 (Dynamic revenuemaximization with heterogeneous objects) is based on
the same model, but considers the alternative goal of revenue maximization, assuming
a finite deadline and a homogeneous Poisson process for customers’ arrivals. The
main insight is that it pays to focus on characterizing the implementable allocation
policies. Then the revenue-maximizing pricing policy follows by applying variational
arguments. Such policy allocates objects based on cutoffs such that prices at each
point in time depend only on the size (but not on the composition) of the inventory.
When the cost function is Schur-convex, this invariance allows one to determine the
optimal size and quality composition of the inventory. Propositions 3 and 4 apply this
conclusion to explain some empirical evidence about markdown sales.
Chapter 4 (The stochastic and dynamic knapsackmodel) keeps the focus on revenue
maximization, but now assumes that agents have multi-unit demand with heteroge-
neous capacity requests. Under incomplete information, this turns it into a dynamic
monopolistic screening problem with multidimensional values. The problem is solved
in three steps: first, the implementable policies are characterized; second, (a relaxed
version of) the revenue-maximization problem is solved; third, sufficient conditions
are given to ensure that the solution of the relaxed version are implementable in the
original problem.
Chapter 5 (Learning and dynamic efficiency) returns to the problem of finding an
efficient allocation under one-unit demand, coupled with the intriguing assumption
that there is parametric uncertainty about the distribution of agents’ private values.
The designer learns gradually about the distribution by observing the strategic choices
of agents, whose actions generate informational spillovers. The main result is that
efficient implementation is possible only when the impact of revealed information on
today’s values is higher than on future option values. Sufficient conditions for first-best
implementation are obtained under Bayesian learning, as well as a characterization of
the second-best. First-best implementation is also possible under two adaptive non-
bayesian models that uniformly converge to the true distribution as the number of
observations goes to infinity.
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Chapter 6 (Long-lived agents) makes agents long-lived and adds the new twist that
they have private information about their own arrival and departure time. It collects
five short variants. The first one assumes perishable objects to show that this leads
to natural mechanisms to attain efficiency or revenue maximization under incomplete
information. The second variant brings in non-perishable goods and explores the anal-
ogy with known models of search with recall. The efficient solution under complete
information may be extended to incomplete information; when arrivals follow a new-
better-than-used renewal process, the technique applies also to revenue maximization.
The third theme is efficiency in queue operations where the designer assigns priorities
over a processing device and the costs of delay are private information. The fourth
section considers dynamic analogs of the efficient Vickery–Clarke–Groves mecha-
nism for queue management when agents have privately known deadlines and thus
their private information evolves over time. Finally, looking at revenue maximization,
it is shown how a monopolist who attains efficiency under such dynamic information
arrival may apply dynamic screening to extract a higher revenue compared to waiting
until all information arrives.
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